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The compromises under discus-
sion between the White House 
and House Republicans — en-
abling states to opt out of ACA 
provisions requiring that insurers 
not charge sicker persons higher 
premiums (community rating) and 
provide essential health benefits 
(such as maternity services) — 
could further alienate moderate 
Republicans who are already un-
comfortable with the bill’s effect 
on Medicaid and insurance cover-
age. The changes the House bill 
makes to insurance regulation also 
could run afoul of Senate budget 
reconciliation rules. And rolling 
back the ACA’s pop-
ular consumer pro-
tections, including 
those for persons 
with preexisting conditions, will 
spark additional controversy. Thus, 
the prospects of GOP efforts to 
resurrect repeal and replace re-
main highly uncertain.
If Republicans cannot pass re-
peal legislation, the Trump ad-
ministration has other options to 
undermine Obamacare, including 
weakening enforcement of penal-
ties for not obtaining insurance 
and eliminating federal payments 
to insurers that are required to 
provide cost-sharing subsidies to 
lower-income Americans for de-
ductibles and copayments.5 Such 
actions could explode the individ-
ual insurance marketplaces. The 
ACA’s insurance exchanges re-
main vulnerable: in some states 
they have been buffeted by high 
premium increases and insurer 
withdrawals. The continuing un-
certainty over the ACA’s fate could 
lead more insurers to exit these 
marketplaces, potentially leaving 
Americans in some areas of the 
country with no options for buy-
ing subsidized coverage.
President Trump remarked that 
“nobody knew that health care 
could be so complicated.” Repub-
licans’ struggles to turn their 
repeal-and-replace rhetoric into re-
ality underscore just how compli-
cated it is.
Disclosure forms provided by the author 
are available at NEJM.org.
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at NEJM.org.
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A Citizen’s Pathway Gone Astray — Delaying Competition 
from Generic Drugs
Robin Feldman, J.D., and Connie Wang, B.A. 
Many medicines are making headlines these days not for 
their breathtaking ability to save 
lives, but for their soaring prices. 
Part of the problem occurs because 
pharmaceutical companies have 
become adept at converting regu-
latory pathways into vehicles for 
profit-boosting pricing strategies. 
Consider the citizen-petition pro-
cess that the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) implemented 
in the 1970s to give the average 
citizen a way to voice concerns. 
A recent large-scale study we con-
ducted using 12 years of FDA data 
reveals that the concerned citizen 
is frequently a drug company 
raising frivolous or questionable 
claims in a last-ditch effort to 
hold off competition.1,2
The Hatch–Waxman Act of 
1984 created a regulatory regime 
to facilitate rapid market entry of 
generics, allowing manufacturers 
of generic drugs to rely on clini-
cal trial data from their drugs’ 
brand-name counterparts. Today, 
more than three quarters of pre-
scriptions are filled with generic 
versions, whose availability can 
reduce the price of a drug sub-
stantially. In response, drug com-
panies have developed complex 
strategies to block entry by gener-
ics. Their incentive is clear: delay-
ing competition for just a few 
months can translate into hun-
dreds of millions of dollars in 
revenue.
Focusing on strategies that in-
volve manipulation of the citizen-
petition pathway, we analyzed 
the timing of the filing of citizen 
petitions relative to the filing and 
            An audio interview 
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approval of the generics that they 
had the potential to block. We 
hypothesized that filings would 
be concentrated toward the end of 
the generic drug’s approval pro-
cess, acting as a final barrier to 
market entry.
In examining all citizen peti-
tions filed between 2000 and 2012 
that could have delayed a generic’s 
market entry, we found wide-
spread, strategic use of the citizen-
petition pathway by drug com-
panies striving to hold off 
competition. Specifically, nearly 
half of the petitions in the final 
data set were filed within a year 
and a half before the FDA ap-
proved the generic, with roughly 
40% filed a year or less before 
generic approval (see graph). The 
clustering of filings at the end of 
the approval process suggests that 
the motive is delay. It is possible 
that the company filing the peti-
tion became aware of the prob-
lem it purported to see with its 
competitor’s application only late 
in the process. The FDA has noted, 
however, that many petitions “con-
tained data that had been avail-
able to the petitioner well before 
the date of the petition.”3 Thus, it 
appears that a large proportion of 
drug companies are using citizen 
petitions as an 11th-hour effort 
to prevent generic competitors 
from gaining FDA approval and 
entering the market.
Use of this delay strategy has 
increased over the past decade: 
the number of such petitions filed 
has effectively doubled since 2003 
(see table). In some years, one of 
every five FDA citizen petitions 
(which include petitions related 
to devices, food, dietary supple-
ments, and tobacco, as well as to 
drugs) has had the potential to 
obstruct generic competition.
Some petitions we examined 
did appear to raise legitimate con-
cerns, and the FDA ruled accord-
ingly. For example, in 2003, Wyeth 
Pharmaceuticals asked the FDA 
to refrain from approving generic 
versions of its immunosuppressant 
Rapamune (sirolimus), whose 
makers had removed part of the 
labeling. The FDA agreed that 
omitting the labeling, which de-
scribed a regimen to reduce the 
risk of renal function impair-
ment, created safety concerns.
Such petitions, however, appear 
to be the exception rather than 
the rule. The FDA denies the re-
quested action for approximately 
80% of citizen petitions filed by 
competitors against drug compa-
nies.4 For example, in 2007, Mu-
tual Pharmaceuticals asked the 
FDA to delay approval of other 
generic versions of the blood-
pressure medicine Plendil (felo-
dipine), citing concerns about how 
Seville orange juice, as opposed to 
“regular” orange juice, affected 
absorption. Seville oranges are a 
smaller, more bitter orange often 
used for marmalade and liquors. 
The FDA denied the petition, stat-
ing that Mutual had “offered no 
data to support [its] hypothesis.” 
Another illustrative case is the 
petition filed by Warner Chilcott 
regarding its acne medication 
Doryx (doxycycline). On the eve of 
generic approval, Warner began 
marketing Doryx tablets with two 
score lines as opposed to one and 
asked the FDA to require that all 
generic versions also be dual-
scored. Citing the lack of any safe-
ty concern associated with single-
scored tablets, the FDA denied the 
petition and immediately approved 
a single-scored generic.
Yet some petitions represent-
ing pure delay tactics have been 
granted. For instance, many peti-
tions ask the FDA to stay approv-
al of the generic version until the 
applicant conducts a test that is 
already required for approval. The 
FDA is forced to grant the peti-
tion, even though the demands 
are redundant given the existing 
requirements.
In 2007, Congress amended the 
FDA Act in an attempt to block 
potential avenues for abuse, re-
quiring that the agency respond 
to citizen petitions related to ge-
nerics within 180 days (shortened 
to 150 days in 2012) and provid-
ing that the agency can summar-
ily deny petitions that are intend-
Months between Citizen Petition Filing and Generic Approval, 2000–2012.
Ranges of months along the x axis indicate the period from the lower number up to but 







































































Months between Citizen Petition Filing and Generic Approval
PERSPECTIVE
1501
Delaying Competition from Generic Drugs
n engl j med 376;16 nejm.org April 20, 2017
ed to delay generic entry and “raise 
no valid scientific or regulatory 
issues.” Unfortunately, the 2007 
amendments have been largely 
toothless. Imposing a new dead-
line may have reduced the delay 
between when the FDA would 
have approved the generic and 
when it actually did so after re-
viewing the petition, but our data 
show that the number of delay-
related petitions continued to grow 
after the amendments were passed. 
Moreover, as of fiscal year 2014, 
the FDA had not summarily de-
nied a single petition under the 
relevant provision.5
What policies may succeed 
where the 2007 amendments have 
floundered? One option is to sim-
ply prohibit companies from fil-
ing citizen petitions referencing 
generic-drug applications. Com-
panies could continue to submit 
generalized petitions, however, 
such as those asking the FDA to 
reconsider all labeling related to a 
given drug. Such petitions would 
have the effect of delaying mar-
ket entry of generics without ex-
plicitly naming them. Moreover, 
some company petitions are justi-
fied, and safety must remain the 
FDA’s priority.
Another possible remedy would 
be to pursue punitive measures to 
deter pharmaceutical companies 
from manipulating the citizen-
petition process. For example, on 
February 7, 2017, the Federal Trade 
Commission filed an antitrust ac-
tion against Shire ViroPharma, 
alleging that the company abused 
regulatory processes by filing 43 
submissions with the FDA (includ-
ing 24 meritless citizen-petition 
filings within one docket) in an 
effort to hold off generic compe-
tition for its gastrointestinal drug 
Vancocin (vancomycin). According 
to the complaint, the behavior 
resulted in costs to patients and 
other purchasers amounting to 
hundreds of millions of dollars. 
Antitrust actions are expensive, 
however, and the burdens of proof 
under current law make it diffi-
cult for the government to pursue 
such actions.
We believe the most promis-
ing approach would be to erect 
procedural blocks, and in Novem-
ber 2016, new FDA rules took 
small steps toward doing so. For 
example, the new rules specify 
that the FDA cannot delay ap-
proval of a pending generic drug 
unless “a delay is necessary to 
protect the public health.” In 
general, however, the rules follow 
the same format as before, in 
which the definition of delay of 
approval, the timing of the pro-
cess, and the limited remedies 
available leave plenty of room for 
strategic behavior. Stronger pro-
cedural blocks — such as requir-
ing that drug companies file their 
citizen petitions within a year af-
ter the generic company files its 
application, or establishing that 
issues raised by petitions will be 
resolved on a separate timeline 
from the generic’s approval pro-
cess — are needed to reduce in-
centives for strategic efforts to 
undermine competition.
Regardless of the policy ap-
proach taken, greater transpar-
ency is essential. As we collected 
data, gaps in the FDA’s current 
system for publicly available in-
formation came into sharp relief. 
Finding information as basic as 
application filing dates for gener-
ic drugs required poring through 
volumes of letters and approval 
documents, and the information 
we sought was often entirely ab-
sent. Without increased transpar-
ency, society cannot curb strategic 
behaviors such as citizen-petition 
abuse. And as always, the public 
pays the cost.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors 
are available at NEJM.org.
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Year
No. of  
Delay-Related  
Petitions
Percent of  
All Petitions  
(no./total no.)
2000  2 4.3 (2/47)
2001  4 6.3 (4/63)
2002  5  4.7 (5/106)
2003 12  10.0 (12/120)
2004 26  14.6 (26/178)
2005 15  10.1 (15/148)
2006 24  13.0 (24/184)
2007 25  15.6 (25/160)
2008 23  13.9 (23/166)
2009 32  18.7 (32/171)
2010 31  20.8 (31/149)
2011 22  14.0 (22/157)
2012 28  19.9 (28/141)
*  Data are from Feldman et al.1
Delay-Related Citizen Petitions, by Year.*
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